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Grammatical Categories and Translatability 
across Languages 
w.A. FOLEY* 
This talk: is, like many, autobiographical in origin. It grew out 
of my experience in study and learning an exotic language of New 
Guinea, Yimas, spoken by about 200 people in a village of the 
same name in the East Sepik Province. Yimas is a language of a 
type as far away as could be imagined from my native language 
English and the other familiar languages of western Europe. To 
illustrate briefly, Yimas can often express in a single word what 
would correspond to a sentence in English: 
(1) ampa-pay-ma-taI] -wura-na-UI) 
me to you-first-inside-for-get-Iet-sago 
'let me get sago from inside for you first' 
Further, grammatical features which playa central role in English 
are commonly irrelevant for Yimas. For example, word order in 
English is pivotal to the meaning of sentences: 
(2) 1. The man saw the women 
2. The women saw the man 
But Yimas is typically indifferent to word order. The following two 
sentences have exactly the same meaning: 
(3) 1. 'The man saw the women' 
panmal pu-n-tay I]aykum 
man them-he-saw women 
2. I]aykum pu-n-tay panmal 
women them-he-saw man 
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In fact, any of the possible six permutations of the above three 
words is grammatical, and all have the same meaning. This is 
because the prefixes to the verb mark the semantics of the sentence: 
who is doing what to whom. pu- indicates that the object of the 
sentence is plural, hence I}aykum 'women', while n- indicates that 
the subject is singular, so panmaZ 'man'. Thus, all six sentences 
must have the meaning of sentence (2.1). If one wanted to express 
the meaning of (2.2), then the prefixes must be switched, but again 
any word order is acceptable: 
(4) panmal 
man 
I]aykum 
women 
'The women saw the man' 
na-mpu-tay 
him-they-saw 
In (4), mpu- expresses a plural subject, I}aykum 'women', and na-, 
a singular object,panmaZ'man'. 
But let me return to my main theme, the experience of learning 
the language. Yimas is exotic, but, as we shall see, it is even more 
alien than these examples indicate. What provided most of the 
feeling of being in unexplored territory when learning Yimas was 
the unfamiliarity of some of the concepts expressed by the 
grammatical categories of the language, categories unmatched in 
either the common European languages I knew or even the more 
trendy Southeast Asian ones. It was learning to use these correctly, 
rather than the complex word structure or unusual syntax, that 
provided the greatest intellectual challenge in acquiring the 
language. Learning to use these required me to attend to the 
situation of talking in a somewhat different way, in a sense, to see 
the world through Yimas eyes, rather than English ones. 
Let me give a simple example, a grammatical category I am 
pleased to say was not too difficult to master-that of number. 
English has a rather simple category of number; we distinguish 
singular, meaning one, from plural, meaning more than one, in 
both pronouns (he or she versus they) and nouns (cat versus 
cats). Yimas in its inimitable way is a little more elaborated. It 
distinguishes a singular (one), a dual (two), a paucal (three to about 
six) and a plural (more than six) for its pronouns, and a singular, 
dual and plural for its nouns as these examples demonstrate: 
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(5) rrm mrm IIlI)kt mum 
'he' 'they-two' 'they-few' 'they-many' 
trl) trl)ki trl)ki 
'tooth' 'teeth-two' teeth-more-than-two' 
So, in speaking Yimas I could no longer go along blithely in my 
English-centricity, using one form for something when there was 
only one, and another when there were more than one; no, I had to 
distinguish was it just two, a few, or more than a few. I had to pay 
attention to the context of talking rather differently than if speaking 
English. At first, this altered way of attending to the world was 
quite conscious, almost as if I had a voice in my head saying 'Bill, 
make sure you notice the number'. But after I mastered the 
category, the discrimination became quite unconscious, no different 
from the way I would correctly use he versus they in English. The 
closest thing I can compare this process to is learning how to drive. 
At first, everything surrounding the driver's seat is unfamiliar and 
new; one has to attend consciously to what one does with the 
clutch, the brake, the steering wheel, etc. After driving for a few 
months, however, everything becomes automatic and one makes 
these various driving movements unconsciously. So was my 
experience of learning the Yimas category of number. 
But just as a driver experiences the driving seat of a car very 
differently from a non-driver, I began to feel that in some subtle and 
difficult to specify ways, I experienced the world differently in my 
Yimas incarnation from my English one. It is the purpose of this 
talk to tease out and clarify just what these differences might be. 
And the base of the difference seems to be the age old question of 
the relationship, if any, between language and thought. What made 
speaking Yimas so different from speaking English (and any other 
language I ever learned) was the strangeness of the concepts, which 
seemed totally unrelated from my English point of view. Using the 
various grammatical categories to express these concepts required 
me to attend to the world differently, to regard things in a situation 
of having central relevance that would be quite irrelevant in 
speaking English. On first entering this brave new world, all these 
discriminations were very consciously made, but on mastering 
them, they became more automatic, although I could never describe 
them as being unconscious, for I always had the feeling of altered 
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experience in speaking Yimas. And the reason they became more 
automatic is that these new concepts became part of my thought 
patterns in a very real sense, part of me came to think like a Yimas. 
So, before proceeding further in these confessions of a field 
linguist, I want to look a bit at what has been said about the 
relationship between language and thought, between words and 
concepts, between sentences and propositions in the other major 
disciplines that study such things: psychology and philosophy. 
Obviously, the closest interrelationship between language and 
thought possible is that they are identical: thought is just internal 
language, speaking to oneself in one's native language (this 
incidentally is the Yimas folk philosophy view: 'to think' is 'to feel 
thoughts-words'). But this is probably too strong: at its logical 
extreme it would make it impossible for an English speaker ever to 
acquire Yimas. If all thought concepts were coterminous with 
English words, how could one ever learn Yimas with its alien 
concepts? Further, all of us have had the 'tip of the tongue' 
phenomenon, in which we seem to have a clear concept in mind, 
but are unable to find the words for it. Finally, all of us have 
probably had the 'Eureka' effect of a flash insight into the solution 
of a problem, after which we settle down and put it into words. All 
of this suggests a somewhat more indirect relationship between 
language and thought than complete isomorphy. Indicators of just 
what the connection might be come from cognitive psychology. 
The crucial area in psychology for investigating questions of 
the relationship between language and thought involves the way 
speech utterances are retained in long term memory. Important 
experiments in this area were done by Sachs in the sixties. Subjects 
were asked to listen to passages on various topics. These were 
interrupted midway, and the subjects were given a recognition 
memory test for a sentence that occurred 0, 40, or 80 syllables 
back. The test consisted of presenting subjects with a sentence and 
asking them if it was identical to one which occurred in the passage 
or not. For example, if they had listened to a passage about Galileo, 
they might be presented with the following four sentences: 
(6) 1. He sent a letter about it to Galileo, the great Italian 
scientist 
2. He sent Galileo, the great Italian scientist, a letter about it 
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3. A letter about it was sent to Galileo, the great Italian 
scientist 
4. Galileo, the great Italian scientist, sent him a letter 
about it 
The actual sentence in the text was 1. Note that 1, 2 and 3 are 
simple paraphrases of each other, but 4 has a quite different 
meaning. At a delay of 80 syllables (20-25 secs), subjects rarely 
made the error of thinking they had heard sentence 4, although they 
frequently believed they had heard sentences 2 and 3, rather than 1. 
This indicates that what was remembered was not the sentence 
itself, but its meaning, or in more logical guise, the proposition that 
the sentence expresses. In other words, the actual sentence heard 
was quickly converted into a propositional representation for 
storage in long term memory. This suggests that what really 
mediates the relationship between language and thought is some 
internal mental representation in the form of a proposition. 
Having said this, however, the question immediately arises as 
to what are the features of these internal mental representations? Are 
they closely tied to the actual native language spoken, so that they 
reflect the language utterance stripped of extraneous syntactic 
packaging alternates (e.g. equivalent to a simple active sentence in 
English)? Or are they universal, reflecting a universal language of 
thought, mapping on to actual spoken languages by rather trivial 
language specific realization rules, a view much beloved by ration-
alist philosophers like Leibniz or Jerry Fodor and linguists like 
Chomsky or Wierzbicka? The answer I will argue for in this lecture 
is that it is a bit of both. Behind each sentence is a propositional 
representation of universal form, but linked to that representation 
and, importantly, part of its meaning, are schemas and networks of 
knowledge that reflect the native language and native culture in 
which that language is spoken. To understand what that would 
mean we need to look in more detail at the structure of these mental 
representations. (I am not unaware of the very serious objections to 
the idea of mental representations raised by philosophers like 
Wittgenstein or biologists like Humberto Maturana. It may be that 
their objections are fatal to the whole programme proposed here 
(and to cognitive science, generally), but it is beyond the scope of 
my talk to more than mention them, and to hope that ultimately what 
I am trying to do will be compatible with their views.) 
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Consider the following possible propositional representation 
(8) for sentence (7) 
(7) The man gave the tourist from Germany the wooden crocodile 
(8) 
GIVE 
MAN--___ J 
TOURIST CROCODILE 
location 
FROM GERMANY WOODEN 
This is what is known as a propositional network representation. 
What is immediately striking about it is the luxuriant use of English 
words to label the nodes and relations: GIVE, PAST, WOODEN, 
agent, location, and, indeed, even relation itself. Of course, what is 
immediately claimed is that these are not really meant as English 
words, but as labels for the concepts behind these words, merely 
convenient tags for universal concepts, for which, it would be 
argued, we could just as easily use Yimas labels. Well, if we are 
going to accept this sleight of hand, the notion of universal concept 
had better be a well defmed notion, and as we shall see, it isn't. 
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For something to be well defmed, we need to specify necessary 
and sufficient conditions for its use. For example, the concept of 
'bird', say, will be well defined if we can provide a set of 
statements like (1) has feathers; (2) has two legs and a beak; (3) has 
wings and can fly, which will be shared uniquely by all members of 
its class and no others. So the defining set of attributes of the 
category determine which items are members and which are not. In 
such a view, concept or category boundaries are sharp; it makes no 
sense to say that some members are better exemplars than others. A 
chicken is either a bird or it is not; end of story. 
Pathbreaking work by Eleanor Rosch in the 1970s blasted 
this traditional view of conceptualization, so that it is no longer 
tenable. She demonstrated that an exhaustive set of attributes was 
not criterial for a category. Attributes tend to cluster together in the 
real world and often are highly correlated (feathers usually occur 
with two legs, a beak, wings and the ability to fly), and recognition 
of categories tends to exploit these redundancies by grouping 
together objects which share these attributes, but these are not 
criterial for the class. Rather categories are built around a central 
prototypical member. This is a representative exemplar of that class 
which shares most features with other members of the category 
and the fewest with items outside of it. For example, a rosella 
would be a more typical bird than a chicken or a penguin and 
certainly more so than a cassowary (in fact in many New Guinea 
cultures the cassowary is not considered a bird at all, and classified, 
if at all, with the pig, rather than other birds). Thus, Rosch's work 
severely taxes the idea of strong and fixed boundaries between 
categories; with the actual experiences of speakers in the real world 
they tend to have fuzzy boundaries and to blend into one another. 
The Platonic view of a concept with a timeless and unique essence, 
defined critically by a set of attributes, seems an endangered 
species. Incidentally, here Rosch exhibits a potential affinity with 
Wittgenstein. For him, concepts are neither mental constructs 
nor abstract ideas, but abilities, which individuals can employ 
in ways acceptable to the rest of the language community as a way 
of doing things. If we reinterpret Rosch's findings to say that 
a concept is a judgement about distance from a prototypical 
exemplar, a judgement largely due to the communities' con-
ventions, the similarity between hers and Wittgenstein's ideas is 
immediately apparent. 
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So, if concepts cannot be construed entirely in their own terms 
by a set of criterial attributes, how are they to be construed? To 
answer this question I have to introduce what I believe to be the 
most exciting new idea to appear in cognitive science in the last 20 
years, one which comes in its modern usage from the field of 
artificial intelligence-the idea of schemas. The idea actually 
surfaced first in the philosophy of Kant; he used schemas as a 
mediating representation between the abstract a priori pure reason 
categories of the mind and raw sensory data. The schema is 
activated by raw sensory experience, but provides an interpretation 
of that experience for and in the terms of the rational categories of 
the mind. 
In its modern guise, the notion of schemas first appears in the 
work of F. C. Bartlett on memory in Cambridge in the 1920s and 
was reported in his book, Remembering. Bartlett had his subjects 
listen to various exotic stories and then asked them to recall the 
plots at various subsequent intervals. He found that they were not 
able to recall such input accurately and that the inaccuracies exhibit 
regular patterns. Subjects would revise the plots until they came to 
resemble standard stories they had heard, a prototypical wild west 
story, for example. Bartlett explained his findings in terms of the 
notion of schemas: the typical memory system used by humans 
involves the use of abstract cognitive structures, schemas which 
arise from prior experience, with the result that information has 
come to be organized in specific ways. Bartlett's pioneering worlc. 
was largely forgotten in psychology in America during the 
behaviourist reign of terror from the 1930s through the 1960s and 
was only reintroduced into cognitive science from artificial 
intelligence in the 1970s. 
Schemas are very useful in modelling the Rosch notion of 
fuzzy categories, for they allow variation in the objects which might 
fit a particular schema. If schemas encode our knowledge about 
categories, then we ought to see a change from less typical to more 
typical members of the category as the features of the members 
better satisfy the schema constraints. For example, for the category 
'bird' consider the following sentences: 
(9) 1. I heard a bird twittering outside my window 
2. A bird flew down and began eating a worm 
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The words 'twittering', 'flew' and 'eating a worm' call up clear 
schemas about birds and their behaviour that we all carry. Rosch 
replaced the category name in these examples with a central member 
('robin'), a less central member ('eagle') and a peripheral member 
('chicken'), and asked subjects to rate the sensibleness of the 
resulting sentences. The scoring of the sentences for sensibleness 
correlated closely with the centrality of the category member: high 
scores for central members, lower scores for less central members. 
Clearly, people associated centrality of category membership with 
likely role playing in a typical schema for that category. As further 
evidence for the fundamental role of schemas in understanding, 
consider the following two short texts: 
(to) With hocked gems financing him, our hero bravely defied all 
scornful laughter that tried to prevent his scheme. Your eyes 
deceive he had said; an egg not a table correctly typified this 
unexplored planet. Now, three sturdy sisters sought proof 
forging along sometimes through calm vastness, yet more 
often over turbulent peaks and valleys. Days became weeks, 
as many doubters spread fearful rumours about the edge. At 
last from nowhere welcome winged creatures appeared 
signifying momentous success. 
(11) The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange 
things into different groups depending on their makeup. Of 
course, one pile may be sufficient depending on how much 
there is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due to lack 
of facilities that is the next step, otherwise you are pretty 
well set. It is important not to overdo any particular 
endeavour. That is, it is better to do two things at once than 
too many ... 
On first reading these texts, you doubtless found them very difficult 
to process and would probably have done very poorly on recall 
experiments. On being told they were about Christopher Columbus 
sailing to America and a washing machine, respectively, they 
immediately become much more comprehensible and memorable. 
This is because those titles called up schemas in your memory 
which guided your understanding. Such is the pivotal role of 
schemas in all cognitive processing of language; understanding 
something anew without a prior script is very difficult. 
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Now I can return to the item which launched this discussion of 
conceptualization and schemas, the propositional network repre-
sentation in (8). The moral of the preceding discussion is that a 
representation does not exist in isolation, but that it is embedded in 
a schema, indeed, multiple schemas. The English words in capitals 
represent concepts, but in so doing they tie into the schemas, which 
these concepts are involved in and in tum defined by. Some 
schemas or parts of schemas are undoubtedly universal, because of 
universals of human experience. For example, the singing of birds 
is probably part of a schema for that category for all human beings, 
albeit not a criterial one, e.g. emus. It is this universality of 
schemas or pans of them which is the grist for the mill for 
proponents of universalist representations like Wierzbicka. This is 
cenainly pan of the story, but it is far from all of it. Equally 
imponant are the schemas which are language and culture specific. 
For example, what is the isolated New Guinea highlander, who has 
never been out of his valley nor seen someone from outside it nor 
ever heard or seen the mass media, to make of the concept 'tourist'? 
Very little, I suggest, for he has no schema to embed it in. When in 
course of time, tourists invade his valley, he is quite likely to 
develop a schema for them and the associated concept, but I submit 
the structure of that schema is always going to be different from that 
of the tourist's own schema, and in this sense, the word is a 
different concept and has a different meaning for villager and 
tourist. Thus, translatability between different languages (ultimately 
different cultures) is possible on the basis of universalist based 
schemas, but this is only a pan of the meaning. What remains 
outside shared schemas remains untranslated. 
This problem is rather more acute with regard to the English 
words written in small letters in (8), the labels for the semantic 
relations among the vocabulary based concepts in the proposition. 
Are these labels for universal concepts? Are they the same for all 
languages, with strictly universalist schemas, or are they again 
hybrids of universalist and language specific schemas? Again, the 
answer seems to be the latter. To illustrate this point, I will consider 
two of the semantic relations in the propositional network represent-
ation in (8), agent and beneficiary, and then consider the schemas 
associated with these in English and two languages of New Guinea. 
First, let us consider the notion of agent. The basic universalist 
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schema associated with this concept is that someone does an action 
and that he wants to do so. The idea of volition, the force of the 
will, seems central for the schema that defines agent. This may 
seem simple but it isn't, as philosophers have shown repeatedly 
over the years. The notion of the will and the associated concept of 
wanting is anything but straightforward. For the notion of wanting, 
I would argue, is very much a cultural construction, a function of 
the schemas we use to defme it. This becomes immediately apparent 
as soon as we encounter a language which has a rather different 
conceptualization of the notion of agent. 
Such a different conceptualization of the agent is found in some 
languages of the Western and Southern Highlands of Papua New 
Guinea. The marker of the agent is a suffix, called the ergative, 
which marks a performer of an action who wants to do an action 
and does accomplish it. So far so good, everything seems as in 
English, but as we might suspect, the problem consists in what 
counts as wanting. Consider the examples in (12) from Podopa, the 
language of a Southern Highlands Province: 
(12) 1. naaQ 0 make ~-ne diadep6 
you sagopalm young we-ERG cut down 
'We deliberately cut down your young sago palm' 
2. ne tikipaae ~ tuki6n6 
other part we open 
'We were going to cut open and eat part of it' 
naanop6 
ea 
The ergative marker indicates that the performer is acting 
independently, is self-motivated and exerts his personal control 
over the situation; while its lack indicates that he is performing 
according to set social obligations, not according to his own 
independent will, and does not assert his personal control over the 
situation. For example, with utterances describing the gathering, 
preparation and exchange of food, the ergative marker is considered 
socially inappropriate. It would highlight the performer's personal 
and independent role in the activities associated with food and 
would mark him as boastful or stingy. As all activities associated 
with food are governed by strict social conventions, the absence of 
the ergative marker is the normal and socially sanctioned usage. 
This is certainly a very different notion of the concept of wanting 
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than that of native English speakers. Podopa speakers have a range 
of schemas associated with proper social behaviours which define 
wanting, and this in turn defines agent. As studies of other New 
Guinea societies have stressed, Podopa speakers understand 
themselves as points in an enormously constraining network of 
reciprocal social responsibilities, responsibilities met through 
exchanges. Food, for example, is not seen as a nourishment 
resource but as an exchange resource. What is crucial here is that 
the self is not conceived as an isolated entity coming into social 
contact through an accord exercised by his own free will, but rather 
as a point defmed by his ordained exchange relationships with all 
other points in the system. Acting within this system, then, cannot 
be viewed as entailing wanting, but acting outside it can, for in that 
case the performer alters the set social interrelationships by a free 
social action chosen by his free will. Such are the schemas of self 
and action that Podopa speakers associate with wanting, and in turn 
these schemas necessarily define agent in this language. The 
universalist schema of wanting and doing is still valid, but it must 
be embedded in quite specific language and culture schemas of self 
and action. 
As a final example, I want to return to Yimas and consider the 
semantic relationship of beneficiary of an action, by comparing the 
schemas for this concept in English with those in Yimas. The 
English data is drawn from Green (1974) and Goldberg (1989). As 
a first approximation for a basic universalist schema for this concept 
let's suggest: the agent of the action intends someone to receive an 
object and that that someone is happy as a result of the event. 
Typically, the beneficiary receives the object 
(13) 1. 
2. 
The man gave the tourist the wooden crocodile 
The nurse fed the sick man his soup 
But all that is necessary is the intention that he receive it (good 
intentions being assumed). 
(14) 1. 
2. 
3. 
Mary baked me a cake 
Harry promised SaIl y a pet snake 
The man offered her a free car 
One schema that English associates with beneficiary but many other 
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languages do not is 'intended audience of a perfonnance'. This 
makes sense in view of expressions like 'to give/have a perfonn-
ance'. A perfonnance is a metaphorical object that the performer 
intends to present for the audience. So we have examples like: 
(15) 1. 
2. 
3. 
She played us 'The Moonlight Sonata' 
She danced us the first act of a new ballet 
They hummed us 'La Marseillaise' 
Many, perhaps most, of the languages of the world could not 
translate the sentences of (15) in the same way as those of (13) and 
(14), because the schemas underlying them are viewed as quite 
different. As we shall see, Yimas is one of these languages. 
Yimas expresses the beneficiary in two different ways, 
according to whether he is physically present in the same location at 
the time the action is done or not. Examples are: 
(16) 1. ura k-ka-taIJ -yawra-t-akn 
coconut it-I-COM-pick up-PAST-for him 
'I picked him up a coconut' 
[he was right there with me when 1 did it] 
2. yara ya-ka-kra- ua-r-akn 
trees them-I-cut-BEN-PAST -for him 
'I cut him those trees' 
[he was absent, maybe too sick or too weak to do it; 
but the wood is for him] 
taI}- COM (for commitative, meaning 'with', for reasons which will 
become apparent below) indicates the concurrent physical presence 
of the beneficiary during the action, while I}a- BEN (also the form 
for the verb root meaning 'give') indicates its absence. Thus, the 
basic universalist schema suggested above for beneficiary must be 
immediately supplemented by two schemas which specify the 
physical presence or absence of the beneficiary and also whether 
transfer of the object is intended. I}a- BEN requires intended 
physical transfer for the absent beneficiary, taI}- COM, as we shall 
see, does not. 
The use of a form meaning 'with' as a marker of beneficiary is 
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quite striking and requires a closer scrutiny. That this is indeed its 
basic meaning is apparent from the following examples: 
(17) 1. tampn pu-kra-mampi-tao -wa-t 
later they-us-again-COM-go-PAST 
'Later they went with us again' 
2. impa-n-tao-kwalca-t 
them-he-COM-rise-PAST 
'He got up with them' 
But as we have seen, it can also express a beneficiary, someone for 
whose good an action is done. 
(18) 1. Mitchell kat ya-ka-tao -wayk-r-akn 
Mitchell cards them-I-COM-buy-PAST -for him 
'I bought Mitchell a (pack of) cards' 
2. upn tampiI) kn-tao -pampal-c-akn 
reart it-she-COM-cook-PAST-forhim 
'She cooked the heart for him' 
But, most strikingly of all, it can also be used to indicate 
maleficiaries, someone who is badly affected and unhappy as a 
result of the action. 
(19) 1. wampuIll) k-mpu-kra-tao-mntk-t 
soya flour it-they-on us-COM-finish-PAST 
'They used up all our sago flour' 
2. rna tmat-pan na-kay-tal}-awkura-kr-mpun 
other day-on it-we-COM-gather-FUTURE-on-them 
'Someday we will steal it from them' 
What does the commitative 'with' have to do with the beneficiary 
'for' and the maleficiary 'on'? Approaching this problem from 
the English based schema of beneficiary proposed above will get 
us nowhere here. Rather we must recognise that we are dealing 
with a very different conceptualisation, a radically different 
schema, and one, as in Podopa, which is crucially tied to Yimas 
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conceptualizations of self and social action. For the Yimas, too, 
conceive of the social actor as someone embedded as a point in a 
network of preordained, reciprocal exchange responsibilities. Thus, 
an action which is done for someone who is present at the time of 
the action is done not so much/or them, as with them, in view of 
the required reciprocal exchange responsibilities that the beneficiary 
then takes on. Further, because of the view of the self and social 
action which provides the schema for the use of ta1)- COM, it is not 
necessary that the participant be a beneficiary, i.e. feel good as a 
result of the action. All that is necessary is that the perfonner of the 
action do so within the network of reciprocal exchange 
responsibilities with a view to affect someone else. Hence, it is 
quite possible that a participant so indicated be deprived by a loss of 
property, i.e. be a maleficiary. Thus, the basic universalist schema 
for the beneficiary and the one underlying the concept as used in 
English is realised by two schemas in Yimas: 
(20) 1. tal)- screma 
(1) perfonner acts on object within preordained network 
of exchange relationships 
(2) someone else is affected by that action, for good or ill 
(3) perfonner typically intends to cause that effect 
(4) if action affects someone for good, that someone 
must be present 
2. 1]0.- schema 
(1) perfonner acts on object 
(2) perfonner intends to transfer object to someone else 
(3) that someone else is not present at the time and 
place of the act 
(4) that someone will feel happy as a result of the act 
But the Yimas correspondences to the English concept of 
beneficiary do not stop with these two. The 'transfer of 
perfonnance' schema illustrated in (15) corresponds to still a third 
Yimas fonn ta1)kway- VIS. 
(21) 1. na-mpu-ta1)/cway-iranta-irm-t 
her-they-VIS-dance-stand-PAST 
'They danced her a dance' 
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2. tpuk ku-n-tar)kway-awl-mpi-ta- -ak 
sago it-she-VIS-get-and-put-PAST-for him 
• She got him a sago pancake' 
tal}kway- VIS means to do an action for/with/near someone while 
visually monitoring him, typically for their response. This visual 
scanning schema of tal}kway- is the third one to correspond to the 
Yimas notion of beneficiary. 
It should be pointed out that the schema descriptions I have 
provided for English, Yimas and Po dopa concepts are not 
definitions. They are simply to provide some prototypical 
conditions under which the relative language constructions are 
used. These need to be embedded in other schemas for full 
utilization and understanding. This is expecially apparent in the first 
line of the taJ]-schema in (20). Only a very complex array of further 
schemas could flesh out the preordained network of exchange 
relationships. These must necessarily be quite similar for the notion 
of scripts pioneered by Schank and Abelson (1977). An example of 
one, Eating in a Restaurant, is in (22): 
(22) Dining at a restaurant 
Scene I: Entering 
customer enters restaurant 
customer looks for table 
customer decides where to sit 
customer goes to table 
customer sits down 
Scene II: Ordering 
customer picks up menu 
customer looks at menu 
customer decides on food 
customer signals waiter 
waiter comes to table 
customer orders food 
waiter goes to cook 
waiter gives order for cook 
cook prepares food 
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Scene III: Eating 
cook gives food to waiter 
waiter brings food to customer 
customer eats food 
Scene IV: Exiting 
waiter writes bill 
waiter goes over to customer 
waiter gives bill to customer 
customer pays waiter/cashier 
customer leaves restaurant 
It is claimed that a great deal of our sociocultural knowledge is 
known in a form like this script, some more fleshed out and 
elaborated, some less. What is critically important here, however, is 
that most of this knowledge is tacit, in the sense of Michael 
Polanyi. We do not think through the actions and scenes of a script, 
we simply do them, without reflection. They can come into 
conscious awareness if something out of the ordinary happens, say, 
we pay before we order, as in a well known restaurant in Boston 
mentioned by Schank, but the normal state of affairs is to run 
through the entire script unreflectingly. In this sense the 
propositional framework so beloved of philosophers and linguists 
may not be the best way to construe scripts; the truth or falsehood 
of the steps of a script are not at issue; what is relevant is that we 
perform them. The end result of all this, then, is that not only are 
the propositional network representations of (8) dependent on 
language and culture specific schemas for their interpretation, but in 
tum these schemas are dependent on sociocultural scripts, whose 
'meaning' (and I use this word hesitantly in this context) may not 
even be representable in propositional terms at all. 
What are the implications of all this for translation? It would 
seem that we could certainly expect to be able to translate pro-
positional network representations like those in (8) into an equi-
valent representation with the forms of another language, by using 
the universal prototypical components of the conceptual schemas. 
However, the highly language and culture specific aspects of the 
conceptual schemas, tied, as they are, to sociocultural actions and 
delineated by the tacit knowledge of the cultural scripts, are much 
more problematic. As I mentioned above, the knowledge of scripts 
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is not propositional knowledge, so we cannot exactly append a 
description of the relevant scripts for a translation from, say Yimas 
into English, and call it part of the translation. Rather, we are 
dealing here with a very different kind of understanding than that 
required in the matching of propositional network representations. 
It involves taking what Clifford Geertz has called the native's point 
of view. It requires an indwelling with the understanding of the 
speakers, a tacit taking on of the fonns and values of the cultural 
scripts. So, can any attempt to translate a passage from one 
language, with all its rich baggage of conceptual schemas and 
scripts, into another language result in anything other than a pale 
lifeless reproduction, which is a very far cry indeed from the 
understanding of the speakers of the translated language? When 
speakers of two languages share a great many of the same cultural 
scripts as between European languages, translation may be closer, 
although still not exact. But when there is very little in common, as 
between New Guinea languages and European ones, the gap is so 
wide that all we can hope for is a very poor approximation. One 
could suggest that we append annotations to the propositional 
translation trying to spell out the relevant scripts. But this does great 
violence to the intentions of the speakers of the original, for whom 
such knowledge is tacit and, further, such a procedure can be 
seriously questioned philosophically, for it confuses knowing how 
with knowing what. Rather, all we can be confident about is the 
claim that between two languages of very different lived experience, 
all that is translatable is propositional infonnation based on 
universalist understanding. What lies outside of universalist under-
standing, we must, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, remain silent about. 
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